

Message Text

PAGE 01 NATO 05946 01 OF 03 061713Z

43

ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-07 INR-10 L-03 NEA-10

NSAE-00 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 USIA-15 TRSE-00

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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 USNATO 5946

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: WORKING GROUP REPORT TO SPC ON NEGOTIATED
INSPECTION AND VERIFICATION

VIENNA FOR USDEL MBFR

REF: USNATO 5856

1. STAFF GROUP HAS ISSUED AS AC/276-WP973)43 REVISED WORKING GROUP
REPORT TO SPC ON TECHNICAL/MILITARY ASPECTS OF NEGOTIATED INS-
PECTION AND VERIFICATION (TEXT PARA 3 BELOW). WG AGREED TO THIS
REPORT AT ITS NOV 29 MEETING, WITH ONLY U.S. RESERVING.
WE WOULD HOPE TO BE ABLE TO LIFT OUR RESERVATION SHORTLY
BUT BELIEVE THAT TEXT SHOULD BE REVIEWED CAREFULLY BY WASHINGTON
BEFORE WE DO SO, SINCE IS HAS PROPOSED ATTACHING WG REPORT AS
ANNEX TO SPC REPORT(REFTEL, PARA 4),

2. AT NEXT SPC MEETING WE WILL PROPOSE ADHERING TO ORIGINAL
APPROACH OF FOLDING IN RELEVANT PORTIONS OF WG REPORT TO SPC
DRAFT. IF WE BECOME ISOLATED IN THIS EFFORT, WE PROPOSE JOINING
SECRET

PAGE 02 NATO 05946 01 OF 03 061713Z

CONSENSUS, BUT SHOULD INSURE THAT WG REPORT CONTAINS NOTHING OBJEC-
TIONABLE TO U.S. PREFERENCES ON MEASURES. IN THIS CONNECTION,
WE NOTE THAT UK SOUGHT TO STRESS THE DESIRABILITY OF A DENSE
SYSTEM OF MOBILE INSPECTION (PER ITS PROPOSED SUBSTITUTE LANGUAGE

QUOTED IN PARA 4 REFTTEL), DRAWING ON LANGUAGE IN WG REPORT TO SUPPORT THIS VIEW. IN ORDER TO TEMPER ANY SUCH JUSTIFICATION, WE PROPOSE: DROPPING LAST SENTENCE OF PARA 13; RECASTING PARA 14 (A) TO READ: "FROM A STRICTLY TECHNICAL AND MILITARY VIEWPOINT, IT WOULD BE TO NATO'S ADVANTAGE TO ACHIEVE...." AND DROPPING PARA 14 (B). TEXT OF WG REPORT FOLLOWS.

3. BEGIN TEXT

NEGOTIATED INSPECTION AND VERIFICATION

REVISED DRAFT REPORT BY THE WORKING GROUP

INTRODUCTION

AS REQUESTED BY THE SENIOR POLITICAL COMMITTEE ON 31ST OCTOBER, 1973, THE MBFR WORKING GROUP HAVE EXAMINED THE MILITARY AND TECHNICAL MERITS AND DEMERITS OF THE MEASURES SET OUT IN THE US PAPER ENTITLED "NEGOTIATED INSPECTION IN MBFR" DATED 5TH OCTOBER, 1973. THE WORKING GROUP EXAMINATION HAS INCLUDED CONSIDERATION OF THE PRACTICAL FEASIBILITY OF THOSE MEASURES. FURTHER DETAILED STUDY WILL BE REQUIRED BEFORE POSSIBLE MEASURES ARE NEGOTIATED.

2. IN ADDRESSING THE US PAPER, THE WORKING GROUP TOOK FULL ACCOUNT OF THE SUBSTANTIVE MATERIAL (1) ALREADY PUBLISHED ON VERIFICATION. THE WORKING GROUP INVITE THE SENIOR POLITICAL COMMITTEE'S ATTENTION TO THE FOLLOWING EXTRACT(2) WHICH, IN THE WORKING GROUP'S VIEW, REMAINS A VALID AND SUCCINCT STATEMENT OF THE BASIS ON WHICH VERIFICATION SHOULD BE APPROACHED; AND AGAINST WHICH THE USEFULNESS, EFFECTIVENESS AND DESIRABILITY OF PROPOSED MEASURES MAY BE JUDGED:

"COVERT INTELLIGENCE CAN PLAY THE MAJOR INFORMATION PRODUCING ROLE IN VERIFICATION, OPERATING AS IT DOES IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE OVERT ROLE ALREADY PLAYED BY SERVICE ATTACHES AND MLMS (MILITARY LIAISON MISSIONS)(3). ANY MBFR AGREEMENT
SECRET

PAGE 03 NATO 05946 01 OF 03 061713Z

SHOULD, HOWEVER, PROVIDE FOR SUCH ADDITIONAL OVERT MEANS OF VERIFICATION, SUPPORTED BY CLAUSES IN THE AGREEMENT SPECIFICALLY DESIGNED TO ENHANCE THEIR EFFECTIVENESS, AS ARE NECESSARY AND/OR DESIRABLE TO RESOLVE AMBIGUITIES IN COVERT INTELLIGENCE, TO PROVIDE A BASIS FOR CONFRONTING A VIOLATOR WITH EVIDENCE OF HIS VIOLATION, AND TO MAINTAIN PUBLIC CONFIDENCE."

THE WORKING GROUP MAK NO JUDGEMENT AS TO WHETHER MLMS AND/OR ATTACHES SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN ANY OVERT INSPECTION SYSTEM AGREED IN MBFR NEGOTIATIONS. THE WORKING GROUP, IN SUCCEEDING PARAGRAPHS, DO POINT TO SOME OF THE TECHNICAL IMPLICATIONS OF SUCH EMPLOYMENT FOR MLMS AND SERVICE ATTACHES.

3. THE SUCCEEDING PARAGRAPHS OF THIS REPORT SHOULD BE STUDIED IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE REPORT IN BRIEF CONTAINED IN PAGES 1 TO 15 OF THE US PAPER ON NEGOTIATED INSPECTION IN MBFR OF 5TH OCTOBER, 1973. THE WORKING GROUP BELIEVE THAT THAT LUCID AND COMPREHENSIVE SUMMARY CANNOT BE FURTHER COMPRESSED, EXCEPT AT THE RISK OF OMITTING IMPORTANT ELEMENTS OR CONSIDERATIONS.

4. THE WORKING GROUP HAVE ADDRESSED THE SIX QUESTIONS POSED BY THE SENIOR POLITICAL COMMITTEE. WHERE PRACTICABLE, THIS REPORT ANSWERS THOSE QUESTIONS DIRECTLY (SEE PARAGRAPHS 24 TO 27). FOR OTHERS, HOWEVER, DIRECT ANSWERS ARE EITHER IMPRACTICABLE OR WOULD RUN THE RISK OF MISLEADING THE READER. THE SUCCEEDING PARAGRAPHS HAVE BEEN FRAMED SO AS TO PROVIDE THE SPC WITH THE ADVICE WHICH THE WORKING GROUP BELIEVE THEY REQUIRE AND INCLUDE RESPONSE TO ALL THE QUESTIONS RAISED.

RESTRICTIONS ON MLMS AND SERVICE ATTACHES

5. WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO AN EVENTUAL ALLIED DECISION ON WHETHER TO INCLUDE MLMS AND/OR SERVICE ATTACHES WITHIN A NEGOTIATED MBFR VERIFICATION SYSTEM, THE WORKING GROUP HAVE EXAMINED THE IMPLICATIONS OF ELIMINATING OR MITIGATING RESTRICTIONS ON MLMS AND SERVICE ATTACHES. THE RESTRICTIONS AT PRESENT IN FORCE ARE:

(A) ON THE WP SIDE:

SECRET

PAGE 04 NATO 05946 01 OF 03 061713Z

(8) PERMANENTLY RESTRICTED AREAS;

(II) TEMPORARY RESTRICTED AREAS;

(III) SPECIAL BORDER ZONE IN EAST GERMANY;

(IV) HARRASSMENT;

(V) EXCLUSION FROM INSTALLATIONS;

(B) ON THE NATO SIDE, SIMILAR BUT NOT SO RESTRICTIVE AND WITH VERY LITTLE HARASSMENT.

6. WHILE MLMS AND ATTACHES HAVE BEEN GROUPED TOGETHER FOR CONVENIENCE IN THIS EXAMINATION, THE WORKING GROUP EMPHASIZE THAT THERE ARE SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THEM, NOTABLY IN THE FORM OF ACCREDITATION, THE AREA COVERED (THE MLMS ARE LIMITED TO THE TWO GERMANIES) AND THE LIMITATION OF MEMBERSHIP OF THE MLMS TO FRANCE, UK, US AND USSR.

SECRET

PAGE 01 NATO 05946 02 OF 03 061926Z

51

ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-07 INR-10 L-03 NEA-10

NSAE-00 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 USIA-15 TRSE-00

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INFO AMEMBASSY VIENNA

USNMR SHAPE

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 3 USNATO 5946

7. THE WORKING GROUP ENDORSE THE VIEW STATED ON PAGE 31, SECTION III, OF THE US PAPER THAT THERE WOULD BE LITTLE MILITARY BENEFIT TO NATO IN THE ELIMINATION OF THE RESTRICTIONS ON INSPECTION IN THE SPECIAL BORDER ZONE IN EAST GERMANY. THEY BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT IT WOULD BE OF GREAT BENEFIT TO NATO IF THE OTHER RESTRICTIONS WERE REMOVED TO THE EXTENT COMPATIBLE (ON THE ASSUMPTION OF RECIPROCITY) WITH THE MAINTENANCE BY NATO OF THE SECURITY RESTRICTIONS ADVOCATE IN AC/276-D(72)1.

OBSERVATION OF AGREED WITHDRAWALS

8. THIS IS DISCUSSED ON PAGES 34 TO 37 OF THE US PAPER, WHICH RECOMMENDS:

(A) THE STATIONING OF WESTERN OBSERVERS AT THE ROAD OR RAIL CROSSING POINTS INTO THE USSR BEING USED FOR THE WITHDRAWAL. (SOME 25 MEN AT EACH CROSSING POINT.)

(B) IN ADDITION, IF NEGOTIABLE, A NUMBER OF TWO-MAN TEAMS TO ACCOMPANY WITHDRAWING UNITS FROM THEIR BARRACKS TO THE CROSSING POINTS.

SECRET

PAGE 02 NATO 05946 02 OF 03 061926Z

9. THE PAPER FURTHER SUGGESTS THAT, IF CARRIED OUT AS ONE OPERATION, THE SOVIET WITHDRAWALS COULD BE COMPLETED WITHIN A MONTH.

10. THE WORKING GROUP THINK IT REASONABLE TO SUPPOSE THAT THE SOVIETS MIGHT WELL BE WILLING TO CONCEDE 8(A) ABOVE IN ORDER TO PROVE THAT THEY WERE FULFILLING THEIR SIDE OF THE BARGAIN. THEIR WILLINGNESS TO CONCEDE 8(B) IS MORE DOUBTFUL, BUT WE AGREE WITH THE USE VIEW OF THE ADVANTAGES TO NATO IF THEY COULD BE PERSUADED TO DO SO. THE PROPOSAL SEEMS TECHNICALLY SOUND AND TO INVOLVE NATO IN NO UNACCEPTABLE RECIPROCITY,

AT LEAST AS REGARDS CONVENTIONAL GROUND FORCE WITHDRAWALS.

POST - REDUCTION INSPECTION

11. POST-REDUCTION INSPECTION IS COVERED IN PAGES 38 TO 50 OF THE US PAPER. ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT MLMS AND ATTACHES ARE NOT USED FOR MBFR PURPOSES, THREE TYPES OF INSPECTORATE ARE CONSIDERED: MOBILE TEAMS; STATIC PERIMETER POSTS, AND CHOKE-POINT POSTS AT KEY POINTS WITHIN THE AREA. AFTER DISCUSSION OF THE PROS AND CONS OF EACH, THE PAPER EXPRESSES A PREFERENCE, ON GROUNDS OF ECONOMY AND EFFICIENCY, FOR A MOBILE SYSTEM ON THE FOLLOWING LINES:

(A) EAST GERMANY

A MINIMUM OF 10 TWO-MAN TEAMS, BASED ON EAST BERLIN, LEIPZIG AND NEUBRANDENBURG.

(B) CZECHOSLOVAKIA

7 TO 8 TWO-MAN TEAMS BASED IN PRAGUE, TABOR AND TRENCIN.

(C) POLAD

7. TO 10 TWO-MAN TEAMS BASED IN WARSAW AND TWO MILITARY DISTRICT HEADQUARTERS UNSPECIFIED.

12. THE US PAPER ALSO DISCUSSES THE PROVISION OF HELICOPTER OR LIGHT AIRCRAFT TRANSPORT FOR TEAMS WHILE TOURING. IT IS SHOWN THAT THE GAIN IN OVERALL EFFICIECY OVER ROAD
SECRET

PAGE 03 NATO 05946 02 OF 03 061926Z

TRANSPORT MAY WELL BE OFFSET BY THE CONTROL AND LOGISTIC PROBLEMS INVOLVED.

13. THE MBFR WORKING GROUP AGREE IN PRINCIPLE WITH THE ADVOCACY OF A MOBILE SYSTEM. THEY NOTE HOWEVER THAT PARAGRAPH 27 OF APPENDIX B TO ANNEX TO AC/276-WP(70)35(REVISED) ADVOCATES A TOTAL OF 130 TWO-MAN TEAMS, BASED ON 20 DIFFERENT SUB-HEADQUARTERS; THIS LARGER TOTAL IS BASED ON A GREATER FREQUENCY OF VISITS, TO MORE NUMEROUS POINTS, THAN IS USED AS BASIS FOR CALCULATION IN THE US PAPER. BECAUSE OF THE CONSIDERABLE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE TOTAL OF 24 TO 28 TEAMS MENTIONED IN PARAGRAPH 11 AND THESE 130 TEAMS, A SYSTEMATIC INVESTIGATION TO ASSESS THE TEAMS REQUIRED IS NEEDED.

14. THE WORKING GROUP SUGGEST THAT:

(A) IT WOULD BE IN NATO'S MILITARY INTEREST TO ACHIEVE THE MAXIMUM NUMBER OF TEAMS WHICH COULD BE TOLERATED ON A BASIS OF DIRECT RECIPROCITY BY THOSE NATIONS DIRECTLY AFFECTED BY THE PRESENCE OF THE TEAMS.

(B) THE RELATIVE DENSITY OF TEAMS IN POLAND SHOULD BE HIGHER THAN THAT SPECIFIED IN THE US PAPER, WHICH RIGHTLY MENTIONS THE IMPORTANCE OF POLAND FROM A WARNING POINT OF VIEW BUT DOES NOT APPEAR TO MAKE THE APPROPRIATE DEDUCTION AS TO THE NUMBER OF TEAMS.

15. ATTACHMENT C TO APPENDIX B TO ANNEX TO AC/276-WP(70)35 (REVISED) SUGGESTS SOME DETAILS OF ORGANIZATION AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS, WHICH ARE NOT DEALT WITH IN THE US PAPER. CONSIDERATION OF THE TECHNICAL (AS OPPOSED TO POLITICAL) ASPECTS OF SUCH MATTERS SHOULD AWAIT DECISION ON THE NUMBER AND GENERAL DEPLOYMENT OF THE TEAMS. WHEN THAT TECHNICAL EXAMINATION IS INITIATED, IT COULD USEFULLY EMBRACE OTHER ORGANIZATIONAL FACETS, SUCH AS THE STRUCTURE OF THE ORGANIZATION, RULES FOR OBSERVERS AND THE ORGANIZATION REQUIRED WITHIN NATO FOR RECEIPT, COLLATION AND INTERPRETATION OF INTELLIGENCE. FURTHERMORE, THE PARTICIPATION OF LIAISON OFFICERS OF THE HOST COUNTRY IN ANY INSPECTION TEAM, AN ISSUE STILL UNDER EXAMINATION (4) WOULD REQUIRE RESOLUTION.

SECRET

PAGE 04 NATO 05946 02 OF 03 061926Z

THE OPEN SKIES PROPOSAL

16. THE OPEN SKIES PROPOSAL IS DISCUSSED, AS A POST-REDUCTION MEASURE, IN PARAGRAPHS 51 TO 57 OF THE US INSPECTION PAPER.

USEFULNESS

17. THE US PAPER STATES THAT, APART FROM DIFFICULTIES OCCASIONED BY WEATHER, AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE WOULD OFFER DISTINCT ADVANTAGES OVER INSPECTION BY GROUND TEAMS, ONCE THE DATA BASE HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED. THE WORKING GROUP SEE NO REASON HOWEVER TO VIEW IT IN AN "EITHER/OR" CONTEXT. THERE WOU

SECRET

PAGE 01 NATO 05946 03 OF 03 061935Z

43

ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-07 INR-10 L-03 NEA-10

NSAE-00 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 USIA-15 TRSE-00

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INFO AMEMBASSY VIENNA
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S E C R E T SECTION 3 OF 3 USNATO 5946

20. THE LAST SECTION OF THE US PAPER DISCUSSES A RANGE OF OPTIONS IN A DESCENDING ORDER OF FLIGHT FREEDOM. IN PRINCIPLE THE WORKING GROUP BELIEVE THAT NATO SHOULD AIM FOR THE MAXIMUM FREEDOM COMPATIBLE WITH FLIGHT SAFETY AND WITH THE SECURITY OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION.

COMBINATION OF MEASURES

21. THE WORKING GROUP TAKE THE VIEW THAT PROVIDED THE SECURITY RISKS TO NATO ARE NOT SERIOUS, A MEASURE OF NETOTIATED AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE (E.G. AIRBORNE PHOTOGRAPHY) WOULD MATERIALLY ASSIST NATO'S VERIFICATION PROCESS, AS COMPLEMENTARY TO THE ACTIVITIES OF GROUND OBSERVERS. STATIC OBSERVATION TEAMS AT A FEW SELECTED KEY MOVEMENT CENTRES WOULD ALSO BE USEFUL TO THE EXTENT THAT ANY MOVEMENT CONSTRAINTS AGREEMENT SPECIFIED THE USE OF THESE CENTRES ONLY FOR MAJOR MOVEMENTS.

MANNING

22. THE QUESTIONS HAVE BEEN ASKED:

SECRET

PAGE 02 NATO 05946 03 OF 03 061935Z

(A) WHETHER SUFFICIENT TRAINED MANPOWER EXISTS TO IMPLEMENT THESE PROPOSALS.

(B) HOW LONG THE PROPOSED OBSERVATION SYSTEMS WOULD TAKE TO ORGANIZE.

THERE SHOULD BE NO SERIOUS DIFFICULTY IN PROVIDING ENOUGH SUITABLE MANPOWER FOR EVEN A 130-TEAM SYSTEM, ONCE THE DECISION IS TAKEN TO DO SO. THE TRAINING AND ORGANIZATION OF THE TEAMS AND OF THE REST OF THE SYSTEM SHOULD NOT TAKE MORE THAN A FEW WEEKS, USING THE EXPERTISE ALREADY GAINED BY THE US AND UK MLMS.

SPECIFIC QUESTION

23. THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPHS CONTAIN DIRECT RESPONSES TO THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS RAISED BY THE SENIOR POLITICAL COMMITTEE ON 31ST OCTOBER, 1973. INDIRECT ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS OF THIS TYPE ARE CONTAINED IN AC/276-D(72)1. THIS PAPER IS ALREADY IN A HIGHLY CONDENSED FORM AND CANNOT USEFULLY BE FURTHER SUMMARIZED.

24. A. QUESTION: "TO WHAT EXTENT WOULD WARSAW PACT VERIFICATION ACTIVITY ON OR OVER ALLIED TERRITORY ACTUALLY INHIBIT NATO FROM STRUCTURING ITS OWN REDUCTIONS IN A WAY LEAST DAMAGING TO ITS MILITARY CAPABILITIES?"

B. ANSWER: THE WORKING GROUP PRESUME THAT ANY NEGOTIATED AGREEMENT WILL BE SUCH AS TO LEAVE NATO ADEQUATE FREEDOM TO STRUCTURE ITS OWN REDUCTIONS IN THE WAY IT THINKS BEST, SUBJECT OF COURSE TO SUCH INHIBITIONS AS MAY BE PROVED UNAVOIDABLE IN OBTAINING ADEQUATE WARSAW PACT REDUCTIONS. IT IS ALSO PRESUMED THAT NATO WOULD INTEND TO ABIDE BY THE TERMS NEGOTIATED. THUS IT DOES NOT SEEM THAT THERE WOULD BE ANY INHIBITION OF NATO IN THIS RESPECT THROUGH THE VERIFICATION PROCESS.

25. A. QUESTION: "WHAT LOSS OF TECHNOLOGY OR CLASSIFIED OPERATIONAL INFORMATION, IF ANY, WILL OCCUR AS A RESULT OF ANY PROPOSED VERIFICATION MEASURES?"

SECRET

PAGE 03 NATO 05946 03 OF 03 061935Z

B. ANSWER: IT IS ASSUMED THAT THIS IS A GENERAL QUESTION NOT REQUIRING ANSWERS IN GREAT DETAIL. PARAGRAPH 4 OF AC/276-D(72)1 LISTS THE PARTICULAR ITEMS OF NATO INFORMATION WHICH ARE TO BE ESPECIALLY PROTECTED IN THE NEGOTIATION OF RULES FOR THE CONDUCT OF OBSERVERS. IF THIS IS PROPERLY DONE, THERE SHOULD BE LITTLE RISK OF LOSS TO THE WARSAW PACT BY NATO OF SIGNIFICANT TECHNOLOGY OR CLASSIFIED INFORMATION.

26. A. QUESTION: "WHAT GAINS IN INFORMATION ON WARSAW PACT FORCES COULD BE ACHIEVED THROUGH ANY OF THE PROPOSED VERIFICATION MEASURES?"

B. ANSWER: THIS AGAIN IS PRESUMED TO BE A GENERAL QUESTION. IT IS AGREED IN THE WORKING GROUP THAT, OWING TO THE RELATIVE OPENNESS OF WESTERN SOCIETY AND THE ACCESS AVAILABLE TO WESTERN MILITARY INFORMATION, AN EXCHANGE OF OBSERVERS IS BOUND TO LEAD TO A SUBSTANTIAL INCREASE IN THE INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO NATO ON WARSAW PACT FORCES AS COMPARED WITH THE GAIN TO THE WARSAW PACT. SUCH AN INCREASE CANNOT HOWEVER BE QUANTIFIED.

27. A. QUESTION: "WILL ANY RESULTING DISADVANTAGES FROM VERIFICATION BE EQUAL IN THEIR EFFECTS ON BOTH SIDES?"

B. ANSWER: TO THE EXTENT THAT THE TERM "DISADVANTAGES" MEANS DISCLOSURE OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION, CLEARLY THE BALANCE OF DISADVANTAGE WILL LIE WITH THE WARSAW PACT. THERE MAY HOWEVER BE SOME POLITICAL DISADVANTAGE FOR BOTH SIDES IN PERMITTING FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT FOR ADVERSARY OBSERVERS. THIS IS NOT A MATTER FOR THE WORKING GROUP.

FOOTNOTES:

(1) (A) AC/276-D(72)1, ACCEPTABILITY OF INSPECTION TO NATO
(B) AC/276-WP(70)35(REVISED), REPORT OF THE MBFR SUB-GROUP
ON VERIFICATION

(2) EXTRACTED FROM ANNEX I TO C-M(70)54(FINAL)
(3) SEVERAL DELEGATIONS EXPRESSED STRONG RESERVATION AGAINST
THE INCLUSION OF MLNS/SERVICE ATTACHES IN ANY NEGOTIATED
VERIFICATION AGREEMENT
SECRET

PAGE 04 NATO 05946 03 OF 03 061935Z

(4) C-M(73)83(FINAL), PARAGRAPH 33
(5) HOWEVER, SOME DELEGATIONS FEEL THAT IF THE RESTRICTIONS
LISTED IN AC/276-D(72)1, PARAGRAPH 5, WERE FOLLOWED, THIS
WOULD EFFECTIVELY EXCLUDE A TRUE OPEN SKIES PROJECT
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